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Abstract. We present a Natural Deduction proof system for the pro-
positional modal -calculus, and its formalization in the Calculus of In-
ductive Constructions. We address several problematic issues, such as
the use of higher-order abstract syntax in inductive sets in presence of
recursive constructors, the encoding of modal (sequent-style) rules and
of context sensitive grammars. The formalization can be used in the sy-
stem Coq, providing an experimental computer-aided proof environment
for the interactive development of error-free proofs in the -calculus. The
techniques we adopt can be readily ported to other languages and proof
systems featuring similar problematic issues.
Introduction
The -calculus, often referred to as K, is a temporal logic which subsumes
many modal and temporal logics, such as PDL, CTL, CTL, ECTL. Despite its
expressive power, K enjoys nice properties such as decidability, axiomatizability
and the nite model property. Therefore, the -calculus is an ideal candidate as
a logic for the verication of processes. Nevertheless, like any formal systems, its
applicability to non trivial cases is limited by long, dicult, error-prone proofs.
This drawback can be (partially) overcome by supplying the user with a
computer-aided proof environment, that is, a system in which he can represent
(encode, formalize) the formal system, more or less abstractly: its syntax, axioms,
rules and inference mechanisms. After having supplied the proof environment
with a representation of the formal system, the user should be able to correctly
manipulate (the representations of) the proofs.
Clearly, the implementation of a proof environment for a specic formal sy-
stem is a complex, time-consuming, and daunting task. An alternative, and pro-
mising solution is to develop a general theory of logical systems, that is, a Logical
Framework. A Logical Framework is a metalogical formalism for the specica-
tion of both the syntactic and the deductive notions of a wide range of formal
systems. Logical Frameworks provide suitable means for representing and deal
with, in the metalogical formalism, the proofs and derivations of the object
system. Much of the implementation eort can be expended once and for all;
hence, the implementation of a Logical Framework yields a logic-independent
proof development environment. Such an environment is able to check validity of
deductions in any formal system, after it has been provided by the specication
of the system in the formalism of the Logical Framework.
In recent years, several dierent frameworks have been proposed, implemen-
ted and applied to many formal systems. Type theories have emerged as leading
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candidates for Logical Frameworks. Simple typed -calculus and minimal intui-
tionistic propositional logic are connected by the well-known proposition-as-types
paradigm [3]. Stronger type theories, such as the Edinburgh Logical Framework,
the Calculus of Inductive Constructions andMartin-Lo¨f ’s type theory, were espe-
cially designed, or can be fruitfully used, as a logical framework [7,2,15]. In these
frameworks, we can represent faithfully and uniformly all the relevant concepts
of the inference process in a logical system: syntactic categories, terms, asser-
tions, axiom schemata, rule schemata, tactics, etc. via the judgments-as-types,
proofs-as--terms paradigm [7]. The key concept is that of hypothetico-general
judgment [11], which is rendered as a type of the dependent typed -calculus
of the Logical Framework. With this interpretation, a judgment is viewed as a
type whose inhabitants correspond to proof of this judgment.
It is worthwhile noticing that Logical Frameworks based on type theory di-
rectly give rise to proof systems in Natural Deduction style [6]. This follows from
the fact that the typing systems of the underlying -calculi are in Natural Deduc-
tion style, and rules and proofs are represented by -terms. As it is well-known,
Natural Deduction style systems are more suited to the practical usage, since
they allow for developing proofs the way mathematicians normally reason.
These type theories have been implemented in logic-independent systems
such as Coq, LEGO and ALF [2,9,10]. These systems can be readily turned into
interactive proof development environments for a specic logic: we need only to
provide the specication of the formal system (the signature), i.e. a declaration
of typed constants corresponding to the syntactic categories, term constructors,
judgments, and rule schemata of the logic. It is possible to prove, informally but
rigorously, that a formal system is adequately represented by its specication.
This proof usually exhibit bijective maps between objects of the formal system
(terms, formul, proofs) and the corresponding -terms of the encoding.
In this paper, we investigate the applicability of this approach to the pro-
positional -calculus. Due to its expressive power, we adopt the Calculus of
Inductive Constructions (CIC), implemented in the system Coq. Beside its ex-
pressive power and importance in the theory and verication of processes, the
-calculus is interesting also for its syntactic and proof theoretic peculiarities.
These idiosyncrasies are mainly due to the negative arity of \" (i.e., the bound
variable x ranges over the same syntactic class of x’); a context-sensitive gram-
mar due the condition on x’; rules with complex side conditions (sequent-style
\proof" rules). These anomalies escape the \standard" representation paradigm
of CIC; hence, we need to accommodate special techniques for enforcing these
peculiarities. Moreover, since generated editors allow the user to reason \under
assumptions", the designer of a proof editor for a given logic is urged to look for
a Natural Deduction formulation of the system. Hence, we introduce a new proof
system in Natural Deduction style for K, the lazy substitution system NlsK .
This system should more natural to use than traditional Hilbert-style systems;
moreover, it takes best advantage of the possibility of manipulating assumptions
oered by CIC in order to implement the problematic substitution of formul
for variables. In fact, substitutions are delayed as much as possible, and are kept
in the derivation context by means of assumptions. This mechanism ts perfec-
556 M. Miculan
tly the stack discipline of assumptions of Natural Deduction, and it is neatly
formalized in CIC.
Due to lack of space, full proofs and the complete Coq signature will be
omitted; see [12] for an extended version of this paper.
1 Syntax, Semantics and Consequence Relation of µK
The language of K is an extension of the syntax of propositional dynamic logic.
Let Act be a set of actions (ranged over by a; b; c), and Var a set of propositional
variables (ranged over by x; y; z); then, the syntax of the -calculus on Act is:
 : ’; ::=  | ¬’ | ’ ⊃  | [a]’ | x | x’
where the formation of x’ is subject to the positivity condition: every occur-
rence of x in ’ has to appear inside an even number of negations (In the following
we will spell out this condition more in detail). We call preformul the langu-
age obtained by dropping the positivity condition. The variable x is bound in
x’; the usual conventions about -equivalence apply. Given a set X ⊆ Var of
variables, we denote by X
def= {’ ∈  | FV(’) ⊆ X} the set of formul with
free variables in X. Capture-avoiding substitutions are the usual maps  → ,
written as lists of the form {’1=x1; : : : ; ’n=xn}; they are ranged over by ;  .
We denote by ’ the formula obtained by applying the substitution  to ’.
The interpretation of -calculus comes from Modal Logic. A model for the
-calculus is a transition system, that is, a pair M = 〈S; [[·]]〉 where S is a
(generic) nonempty set of (abstract) states, ranged over by s; t; r, and [[·]] is the
interpretation of command symbols: for all a, we have [[a]] : S → P(S).
Formul of -calculus may have free propositional variables; therefore, we
need to introduce environments, which are functions assigning sets of states to
propositional variables: Env def= Var → P(S). Given a model M = 〈S; [[·]]〉 and
an environment , the semantics of a formula is the set of states in which it
holds, and it is dened by extending [[·]] compositionally:
[[ ]] def= ∅ [[’ ⊃  ]] def= (S \ [[’]]) ∪ [[ ]]
[[x]] def= (x) [[[a]’]] def= {s ∈ S | ∀r ∈ [[a]]s : r ∈ [[’]]}
[[¬’]] def= S \ [[’]] [[x’]] def= ⋂{T ⊆ S | [[’]][x 7→ T ] ⊆ T}
It is customary to view a formula ’ with a free variable x as dening a function
’x : P(S) → P(S), such that for all U ⊆ S: ’x(U) = [[’]][x 7→ U ]. The intuitive
interpretation of x’ is then the least xed point of ’x. The syntactic condition
on the formation of x’ ensures the monotonicity of ’x, and hence, by Knaster-
Tarski’s theorem, the existence of the lfp as well [8]. This does not hold if we
drop the condition on the formation of x’; e.g., the formula ¬x identies the
function (¬x)x(T ) = S \T , which is not monotone and has no (least) xed point.
In order to have a semantical counterpart of the syntactic notion of \deduc-
tion", we introduce a consequence relation for the -calculus:
Denition 1. Let M = 〈S; [[·]]〉 be a model for K. The consequence relation
for K with respect to M is a relation |=M⊆ P<!() × , dened as follows
(where [[Γ ]] def=
⋂
’2Γ [[’]]): Γ |=M ’ ⇐⇒ ∀:[[Γ ]] ⊆ [[’]] .
The (absolute) consequence relation for K is: Γ |= ’ ⇐⇒ ∀M:Γ |=M ’.










negin(x; ’) posin(x;  )
posin(x; ’ ⊃  )
posin(x; ’)
posin(x; [a]’)
posin(x; ’) negin(x;  )
negin(x; ’ ⊃  )
negin(x; ’)
negin(x; [a]’)
for z 6= x : posin(x; ’[z=y])
posin(x; y’)
for z 6= x : negin(x; ’[z=y])
negin(x; y’)
Fig. 1. The positivity proof system.
2 A Proof System for the Positivity Condition
Since we aim to encode the -calculus in some logical framework, we need to
enforce the context-sensitive condition on the formation of formul of the form
x’. That is, we ought to specify in detail the condition of \occurring positive in
a formula" for a variable. This notion can be represented by two new judgments
on formul and variables, posin and negin, which are derived by means of the
rules in Figure 1. Roughly, posin(x; ’) holds i all occurrences of x in ’ are
positively; dually, negin(x; ’) holds i all occurrences of x in ’ are negative.
Notice that if x does not occur in ’, then it occurs both positively and negatively.
More formally, the notions these auxiliary judgments capture are the following:
Denition 2 ((Anti)Monotonicity). For ’ ∈ , x ∈ Var, we say that ’
is monotone on x (written Monx(’)) i ∀M;∀;∀U; V ⊆ S: U ⊆ V =⇒
’x(U) ⊆ ’x(V ). We say that ’ is antimonotone on x (written AntiMonx(’))
i ∀M;∀;∀U; V ⊆ S: U ⊆ V =⇒ ’x(U) ⊇ ’x(V ).
These notions refer directly to the semantic structures in which formul take
meaning. In fact, the syntactic conditions of positivity/negativity are sound wrt
the semantic condition of monotonicity/antimonotonicity:
Proposition 1. ` posin(x; ’) ⇒ Monx(’) and ` negin(x; ’) ⇒ AntiMonx(’).
The converse of Proposition 1 does not hold. Consider e.g. ’ def= (x ⊃ x):
clearly, [[’]] = S always, and hence (x ⊃ x)x is both monotone and antimono-
tone. However, x does not occur only positively nor only negatively in ’. Hence,
we cannot derive ` posin(x; (x ⊃ x)) nor ` negin(x; (x ⊃ x)). This is generalized
in the following result, which can be proved by induction on the syntax of ’:
Proposition 2. If x ∈ FV(’) occurs both positively and negatively in ’ then
neither posin(x; ’) nor negin(x; ’) are derivable.
We can restrict ourselves to only positive formul without loss of generality: by
Lyndon Theorem [4], every monotone formula is equivalent to a positive one.
3 The Proof System NlsµK
Usually, systems for -calculus are given in Hilbert style [8]. Here we present
NlsK (Figure 2), a lazy substitution proof system in Natural Deduction style for
K. This system is called \lazy" after that substitutions of formul for variables
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’ ≡  ’ ≡ ’
’ ≡  
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’ ≡  
¬’ ≡ ¬ 
’1 ≡  1 ’2 ≡  2
(’1 ⊃ ’2) ≡ ( 1 ⊃  2)
’ ≡  
[a]’ ≡ [a] 
’{z=x} ≡  {z=x}
x’ ≡ x z fresh
Fig. 2. The lazy substitution, Natural Deduction-style proof system NlsµK for -
calculus: logical system (top), and congruence system (bottom).
NlsK is composed by two derivation systems, the logical one and the congru-
ence one. Roughly, the logical system allows for deriving formul from formul
(assumptions) and bindings, which are judgments of the form x 7→ ’, where
x ∈ Var and ’ ∈ . The congruence system allows for deriving judgments of the
form ’ ≡  , from a list of bindings. More precisely, we introduce the following
Denition 3. A set of assumptions (denoted by Γ ) is any nite set of formul;
a binding list (denoted by ) is a list 〈x1 7→ ’1; : : : ; xn 7→ ’n〉 such that for all
i 6= j: xi 6= xj, and for all i ≤ j: xi 6∈ FV(’j).
A derivation of ’ from assumptions Γ and bindings  is denoted by ;Γ ` ’;
a derivation of ’ ≡  from  is denoted by  ` ’ ≡  .
The logical system is composed by a standard set of rules for classical proposi-
tional logic, extended by Scott’s rule Sc for minimal modal logic, the congruence
rule Cngr, and the intro/elimination rules -I, -E. The rules for  have a di-
rect semantic interpretation: the introduction rule states that (the meaning of)
x’ is a prexed point of ’x; the elimination rule states that (the meaning of)
x’ implies, and then \is less than", any prexed point of ’x. Therefore, these
rules state that (the meaning of) x’ is the least xed point, of ’x.
In rule Sc, the square brackets surrounding Γ mean that  may depend only
on the discharged assumption Γ . Similarly, in rule -E, the formula ’{z=x} is
the only assumption that the subderivation of  may depend on. These \modal"
side conditions can be explicated clearly by a Gentzen-like presentation:
Sc
;Γ `  
; [a]Γ ` [a] -E
;Γ ` x’ ; z 7→  ;’{z=x} `  
;Γ `  z fresh
No logical rule requires a binding as a premise; bindings are only discharged,
in rules requiring a substitution (i.e., rules -I, -E). In these rules, variables are
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not textually replaced by the corresponding formula, but only by an -equivalent
(\fresh") variable. The discharged hypothesis keeps in the derivation context the
binding between the substituted variable and the corresponding formula. These
hypotheses form a binding list which is used by the congruence system: roughly,
we can prove  ` ’ ≡  i ’ and  are the same formula, \up to ". More
precisely, a binding list  corresponds to a particular form of substitution, which
can be dened by induction on  as hi
def= {}, ;x 7!’ def=  ◦ {’=x}. Then, ≡
is the smallest congruence which contains :
Proposition 3. For all , for all ’; ∈ :  ` ’ ≡  ⇐⇒ ’ =  
The resulting system is then sound and complete:
Theorem 1. For all , for all Γ nite and ’ ∈ : ;Γ ` ’ ⇐⇒ Γ |= ’
Proof. (Sketch) Soundness (⇒) is proved by showing that each rule is sound.
Completeness (⇐) can be proved by proving that axioms and rules of a complete
Hilbert-style system (e.g., Kozen’s one [17]) are derivable in NlsK . ut
Corollary 1. For Γ nite set of formul, ’ formula: ∅;Γ ` ’ ⇐⇒ Γ |= ’.
4 Encoding the Language of µ-Calculus
The encoding of the language of -calculus is quite elaborate. The customary
approach, is to dene an inductive type, o:Set, whose constructors correspond
to those of the language of K. In order to take full advantage of -conversion
and substitution machinery provided by the metalanguage, we adopt the higher
order abstract syntax [5,7]. In this approach, binding constructors (like ) are
rendered by higher-order term constructors; that is, they take a function. The
na¨ve representation of  would be mu:(o->o)->o; however, this solution does
not work inside an inductive denition of CIC, because it leads to a non-well-
founded denition [2,5].
The second problem is the presence of a context-sensitive condition on the
applicability of : in order to construct a formula of the form x’, we have to
make sure that x occurs positively in ’. Inductive types do not support this kind
of restriction, since they dene only context-free languages [13].
In order to overcome the rst problems, we adopt the bookkeeping technique
[13]. We introduce a separate type, var, for the identiers. These variables act as
\placeholders" for formul: they will be bound to formul in the application of
-I and -E rules, by means of an auxiliary judgment. There are no constructors
for type var: we only assume that there are innitely many variables.
Parameter var : Set.
Axiom var_nat : (Ex [srj:var->nat](n:nat)(Ex [x:var](srj x)=n)).
Then, we dene the set of preformul of -calculus, also those not well formed:
Parameter Act : Set.
Inductive o : Set := ff : o | Not : o -> o | Imp : o -> o -> o
| Box : Act -> o -> o | Var : var -> o | mu : (var->o) -> o.
Notice that, the argument of mu is a function of type var->o. In general, this
may arise exotic terms, i.e. terms which do not correspond to any preformula of
the -calculus [5,13]. These terms are built by using the Case term constructor
560 M. Miculan
of inductive type theory, over the type of variables. This cannot be achieved in
our approach since var is not declared as an inductive set. Of course, the price
we pay is that equality between variables is not decidable [13, Section 11.2].
Now, we have to rule out all the non-well-formed formul. At the moment,
the only way for enforcing in CIC context-sensitive conditions over languages is to
dene a subtype by means of -types. As a rst step, we formalize the system for
positivity/negativity presented in Figure 1, introducing two judgments posin,
negin of type var->o->Prop. A careful analysis of the proof system (Figure 1)
points out that the derivation of these judgments is completely syntax driven.
It is therefore natural to dene these judgments as recursively dened functions,
instead of inductively dened propositions. This is indeed feasible, but the rules
for the binding operators introduce an implicit quantication over the set of
variables dierent from the one we are looking for. This is rendered by assuming
a new variable (y) and that it is dierent from the variable x (see last cases):
Fixpoint posin [x:var;A:o] : Prop :=
<Prop>Cases A of ff => True | (Not B) => (negin x B)
| (Imp A1 A2) => (negin x A1)/\(posin x A2) | (Box a B) => (posin x B)
| (Var y) => True | (mu F) => (y:var)~(x=y)->(posin x (F y))
end
with negin [x:var;A:o] : Prop :=
<Prop>Cases A of ff => True | (Not B) => (posin x B)
| (Imp A1 A2) => (posin x A1)/\(negin x A2) | (Box a B) => (negin x B)
| (Var y) => ~(x=y) | (mu F) => (y:var)~(x=y)->(negin x (F y))
end.
Therefore, in general a goal (posin x A) can be Simplied (i.e., by applying
the Simpl tactic, in Coq) to a conjunction of only three forms of propositions:
True, negations of equalities or implications from negations of equalities to ano-
ther conjunction of the same form. These three forms are dealt with simply in
Coq, hence proving this kind of goals is a simple and straightforward task.
Similarly, a preformula is well formed when every application of  satises
the positivity condition:
Fixpoint iswf [A:o] : Prop :=
<Prop>Cases A of ff => True | (Var y) => True | (Not B) => (iswf B)
| (Imp A1 A2) => (iswf A1)/\(iswf A2) | (Box a B) => (iswf B)
| (mu F) => (x:var)(iswf (F x))/\((notin x (mu F)) -> (posin x (F x)))
end.
In the case of , we locally assume the fact that the x we introduce does not
appear in the formula, i.e. it is fresh. Although this is automatically achieved
by the metalanguage, we may need this information for proving (posin x (F
x)). This is achieved by the hypothesis (notin z (mu F)). The judgment notin
and the dual isin (see [12]) are auxiliary judgments for occur-checking. Roughly,
(notin x A) holds i x does not occur free in A; dually for isin.
Finally, each formula of the -calculus is therefore represented by a pair
preformula-proof of its well-formedness:
Record wfo: Set := mkwfo {prp : o; cnd : (iswf prp)}.
In order to estabilish that our encoding is faithful, we introduce the following
notation: for X = {x1; : : : ; xn} ⊂ V ar, let X def= x1 : var; : : : ; xn : var, oX def=
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{t | X ` t : o; t canonical} and wfoX def= {t ∈ oX | ∃d:X ` d : (iswf t)}.
We can then dene the encoding map "X : X → oX , as follows:
"X(x) = x "X(’ ⊃  ) = (Imp "X(’) "X( ))
"X(¬’)=(Not "X(’)) "X([a]’)=(Box a "X(’))
"X( ) = ff "X(x’) = (mu [x:var]"X;x(’))
Theorem 2. The map "X is a compositional bijection between X and wfoX .
Proof. (Sketch) Long inductions. First, one proves that posin, negin adequa-
tely represent the positivity/negativity proof system. Then, a preformula ’ is a
formula i each application of  is valid, i for each application of  there exists
a (unique) witness of posin, i there exists an inhabitant of (iswf "X(’)). ut
5 Encoding the Proof System NlsµK
In the encoding paradigm of Logical Frameworks, a proof system is usually
represented by introducing a proving judgment over the set of formul, like T:o
-> Prop. A type (T phi) should be intended, therefore, as \’ is true;" any
term which inhabits (T phi) is a witness (a proof) that ’ is true. Each rule is
then represented by a type constructor of T. Moreover, substitution schemata
for binding operators need not to be implemented \by hand", because they are
inherited from the metalanguage. This is the case, for instance, of \∀" in First
Order Logic; for further examples and discussion, we refer to [5,7].
However, in representing the proof system NlsK , two dicult issues arise:
the encoding of proof rules, like Sc and -E, and the substitution of formul for
variables in rules -I and -E. Moreover, Scott’s rule is parametric in the number
of assumptions which have to be \boxed". These issues escape the standard
encoding paradigm, so we have to accommodate some special technique.
Actually, in the underlying theory of CIC there is no direct way for enforcing
on a premise the condition that it is a theorem (i.e. that it depends on no
assumptions) or, more generally, that a formula depends only on a given set of
assumptions. This is because the typing rules of PTS’s are strictly in Natural
Deduction style. Therefore, in presence of sequent-style rules like Sc and -E, one
could encode a complete sequent calculus introducing the type olist of lists of
formul, the sequent judgment Seq:olist->o->Prop, and all the machinery of
Gentzen’s original system [6]. This would lead to an unusable proof system: even
if our rules have a Natural Deduction flavour, all the goals would be crammed
with the list of hypotheses, and we should deal with supplementary structural
rules for manipulating the list of assumptions.
Instead, we represent more eciently the assumption set by means of the
proof context provided by CIC, i.e., by taking advantage of the possibility of
reasoning \under assumptions" [1]. First, we represent 7→ and ≡ by means of two
judgments bind:var->o->Prop and cngr:o->o->Prop, respectively. The former
has no constructor (it declared as a Parameter), while the latter is rendered as
an inductive predicate, as expected. In particular, the congruence rule for  is
rendered by means of a locally quantied variable (see [12] for the whole listing):
Parameter bind : var -> o -> Prop.
Inductive cngr : o -> o -> Prop :=
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cngr_bind : (x:var)(A:o)(bind x A) -> (cngr (Var x) A)
(... other rules ...)
| cngr_mu :(A,B:var->o)((x:var)(cngr (A x) (B x)))->(cngr (mu A) (mu B)).
Then, we introduce the basic proving judgment, T:U->o->Prop, where U a set
with no constructors. Elements of U will be called worlds for suggestive reasons.
Each pure rule (i.e., with no side condition), is parameterized over a generic
world, like the following:
Axiom Imp_E : (w:U)(A,B:o)(T w (Imp A B)) -> (T w A) -> (T w B).
Therefore, in a given world all the classical rules apply as usual. It should be
noticed, however, that we require a locally introduced formula to be well formed.
This is the case of ⊃-I:
Axiom Imp_I : (w:U)(A,B:o)(iswf A)->((T w A)->(T w B))->(T w (Imp A B)).
Indeed, it can be shown that if we allow for non-well formed formul in these
\negative positions," we get easily an inconsistent derivation.
Proof rules, on the other hand, are distinguished by local quantications
of the world parameter, in order to make explicit the dependency between a
conclusion and its premises. The rule -E is encoded as follows:
Axiom mu_E : (F:var->o)(iswf A) ->
((z:var)(notin z (mu F)) -> (bind z A) -> (w’:U)(T w’ (F z))->(T w’ A))
-> (w:U)(T w (mu F)) -> (T w A).
The idea behind the use of the extra parameter is that in making an assump-
tion, we are forced to assume the existence of a world, say w, and to instantiate
the judgment T also on w. This judgment then appears as an hypothesis on w.
Hence, deriving as premise a judgment, which is universally quantied with re-
spect to U, amounts to establishing the judgment for the generic world w’ on
which only the given assumptions are made, i.e. on the given assumptions.
This idea can be suitably generalized to take care of an unlimited number
of assumptions. In fact, a generic sequent ’1; : : : ; ’n ` ’ is faithfully represen-
ted by the type (w:U)(T w A1)->...->(T w An)->(T w A) where Ai = "X(’i)
and A= "X(’). The locally quantied world w forces any proof of (T w A) to
depend only on the given assumptions. The problem is capturing the parametric
flavour expressed by the \. . . ". At this end, we introduce lists of formul and
the auxiliary function Sequent:U->o->olist->Prop:
Inductive olist : Set := nil : olist | cons : o -> olist -> olist.
Fixpoint Sequent [w:U;B:o;l:olist] : Prop :=
Cases l of
nil => (T w B) | (cons A t) => (T w A)->(Sequent w B t)
end.
Therefore, the aforementioned representation of ’1; : : : ; ’n ` ’ is denoted by
(w:U)(Sequent w B G) where G is the list composed by A1,. . . ,An. In fact,
(Sequent w B G) is exactly -equivalent (it can be reduced) to (T w A1)->
...->(T w An) -> (T w B). We can therefore represent Scott’s rule as follows:
Fixpoint Boxlist [a:Act; l:olist] : olist :=
Cases l of nil => nil | (cons B t) => (cons (Box a B) (Boxlist a t)) end.
Axiom Sc : (G:olist)(B:o)(a:Act) ((w’:U)(Sequent w’ B G)) ->
(w:U)(Sequent w (Box a B) (Boxlist a G)).
Formalizing a Lazy Substitution Proof System for -Calculus 563
where the map Boxlist:Act->olist->olist represents exactly the \[a]Γ" not-
ation of rule Sc. Hence, we can use the conversion tactics provided by Coq for
automatically converting applications of Sequent to the right proposition.
The encoding of -E (and -I) uses also the auxiliary judgment bind. Follo-
wing the idea of NlsK , the context ’(·) of x’(x) is lled by a fresh (i.e., locally
quantied) variable z. The binding between z and the corresponding formula
is kept in the derivation environment by the hypothesis (bind z A). This hy-
pothesis can be used in the derivation of congruence judgments, for replacing
formul only when it is needed. For an example, see [12].
The discharged hypothesis (notin z (mu F)) in rule mu_E reflects at the
logical level, the fact that z is fresh. Although freshness of z obviously holds,
it cannot be inferred in the system because it belongs to the metalevel of the
system. Hence, we reify it by means of the discharged hypothesis, which may
be needed in the rest of derivation for inferring well-formedness of discharged
formul in rules Raa, ⊃-I, ¬-I.
In order to state the adequacy of our formalization w.r.t. NlsK , we intro-
duce the following notation. Let X ⊂ Var be nite, and ’1; : : : ; ’n; ’ ∈ X ;
then, for x1; : : : ; xn ∈ X, we denote by X(x1 7→ ’1; : : : ; xn 7→ ’n) the con-
text b1: (bind x1 "X(’1)); : : : bn: (bind xn "X(’n)), and, for w:U, we denote by
γX;w(’1; : : : ; ’n) the context h1: (T w "X(’1)); : : : ; hn: (T w "X(’n)).
Theorem 3. Let X ⊂ V ar be nite,  a binding list such that FV() ⊆ X,
and Γ ⊂ X nite. Then, for all ’1; ’2 ∈ X :
1.  ` ’1 ≡ ’2 i there is t such that X ; X() ` t : (cngr "X(’1) "X(’2))
2. ;Γ ` ’1 i there is t such that X ; X(); w : U; γX;w(Γ ) ` t : (T w "X(’1)).
Proof. (Sketch) Directions ⇒ are proved by induction on the proofs of  ` ’1 ≡
’2 and ;Γ ` ’1. Directions ⇐ are proved by induction on the syntax of t:
each constructor of (cngr A B) and (T w A) corresponds to a rule of NlsK . ut
6 Conclusions
In this paper we have introduced an original proof system NlsK for the pro-
positional modal -calculus, and its formalization in the Calculus of Inductive
Constructions. Beside the formalization, NlsK is interesting on its own for se-
veral reasons: it is in Natural Deduction style, it has been proved complete with
respect to logical consequences (while traditional Hilbert-style proof systems are
complete with respect to theorems), and its usage should be easier than axioma-
tic proof systems. Moreover, in NlsK substitutions of formul for variables are
not always performed, but they may be delayed until actually needed.
In the encoding, we have addressed several problematic issues. First, the
use of the higher order abstract syntax frees us from a tedious encoding of the
mechanisms involved in the handling of -conversion, because it is automati-
cally inherited from the metalevel. Secondly, substitution is represented by a
congruence proof system, whose proofs are syntax-driven and can be highly au-
tomatized in the Coq environment. Thirdly, we have faithfully represented the
context-sensitive language of -calculus by formalizing the notion of \well-formed
formula." Finally, the modal nature of impure rules of -calculus (Sc and -E)
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has been eectively rendered, although Logical Frameworks do not support di-
rectly modal rules. The techniques we have adopted can be readily ported to
other formalisms featuring similar problematic issues.
From a proof-theoretical point of view, rule Sc is not satisfactory, since it
breaks the typical introduction/elimination pattern of Natural Deduction sy-
stems. Whether there is a truly Natural Deduction formulation of the system
remains an open question.
The implementation of substitution by means of an environment of bindings
has been previously investigated in the context of logic programming by Miller
[14], and in that of model checking by Stirling and Walker [16]. This latter fact
deserves further investigation. For instance, NlsK could be integrated with a
model checker in a simple and ecient way; moreover, the model checker could
be implemented in Coq, and its correctness formally veried.
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